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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
UNI'TED STEEL WORKERS OF AMER-
ICA, LOCAL NO. 5486, et al, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
B01\RD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUS-
TRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
et al, Respondents 
Case No. 
9322 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
'THE FORM OF THE RECORD BELOW 
The case on review consolidates five class and one indi-
vidual decision. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, one 
joint petition \vas filed. 
In order to refer with facility to the transcripts, exhibits 
and documents of record, the following references will be 
observed: 
( 1) Board of Review File #60-BR-230, containing the 
record of United Steelworkers of America, Local 
5486, will be referred to as BR-230 (R. 1 et seq.) 
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(2) Board of Review File #60-BR-231, containing the 
record of Elvere R. Davis, will be referred to as 
BR-231 (R. 1 et seq.) 
(3) Board of Review File #60-BR-235, containing the 
record of International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers, Local1438, will be referred to as BR-235 
(R. 1, et seq.) 
( 4) Board of Review File #60-BR-236, containing the 
record of United Steelworkers of America, Locals 
4347, 4413, 5120 and 4329, will be referred to as 
BR-236 (R. 1 et seq.) 
(5) Board of Review File #60-BR-237, containing the 
record of International Union of Mine, ~Jill and 
Smelter Workers, Locals 485 and 392, and Office 
Employees International Union, Local 286, \\'ill 
be referred to as BR-23 7 (R. 1 et seq.) 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellants here seek to review orders of the Utah 
Industrial Commission which affirmed decisions of its Appeals 
Referee, denying claimants above eligibility for unemployment 
benefits. 
Initially the Unemployment Compensation Division 
awarded benefits effective November 22, 1959, to Kennecott's 
technical laboratory employees, represented by Steelworkers 
Local # 5486. Similar awards allowing benefits to Kennecott 
clerical employees at the Utah smelter, represented by Steel-
workers Local 4329 were made effective December 28, 195~ 
Both a wards, however, were reversed by a decision of the 
Appeals Referee on January 15, 1960 and March 10, 1960. 
All other claimants were denied benefits by the Unemployment 
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Cotnpensation Division and Appeals Referee; timely petitions 
to the Board of Review were filed; and in each case, on July 8, 
1960, the Appeals Referee's decisions denying benefits to all 
claitnants were affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nineteen separate local and autonomous labor unions 
had working agreements and contracts between each un1on 
and Kennecott Copper Corporation, Utah Division, which 
expired by their terms on June 30 and July 31, 1959. 
It \vill be necessary to designate these local unions through 
their contractual relationship with the company for easy refer-
ence. 
United Steelworkers of America 
Local 4413 represents 713 production and maintenance 
workers at the company's refinery. 
Local 5120 represents 47 clerical workers at the com-
pany's refinery. 
Local 4347 represents 1160 production and maintenance 
workers at the company's smelter. 
Local 4329 represents 34 clerical workers at the com-
pany's smelter. 
Local 5486 represents 3 5 laboratory and technical work-
ers at the company's Arthur mills. 
International Union of Mine1 Mill and Smelter Workers 
Local 392 represents 1398 production and maintenance 
employees at the company's Arthur-Magna mills. 
Local 485 represents 1188 production and maintenance 
\vorkers at the company's Bingham mine. 
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International Brothefhood of Electrical Workers 
Local 1438 represents 68 power station employees at 
the Central Power Station. 
Office Employees International Union 
Local 286 represents 99 clerical and office workers at 
the company's Bingham mine. 
Elvere R. Davis was employed as a carpenter in the com-
pany's mill and was a member of Local 392, Mine-Mill Union. 
In addition to these unions, the company had working 
agreements with local unions: 692 Mine-Mill Local, 1845 
Electrical Workers, Lodge 670 Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Firemen & Enginemen, Lodge 506 Order of Railroad Carmen 
& Brakemen, Lodge 1045 Brotherhood of Railroad Carmen of 
America, Local 3 Operating Engineers, Local 1081 Electrical 
Workers, Lodge 568 Machinists, Lodge 15 5 System Federation, 
and Lodge 844 Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and En-
gtnemen. 
Beginning in April, 1959, all unions involved attempted 
to negotiate new \vorking agreements. When on August 1, 
1959, all parties were still in negotiations, each of the former 
agreements was extended on a day-to-day basis to August 10, 
1959. On this latter date, because of a strike called, the con1-
pany ceased its operation, except for certain maintenance and 
supervisory work. 
The history of bargaining between the separate locals and 
Kennecott Copper Corporation goes back to the late 1930's 
and was conducted on the basis of individual union bargaining. 
At times each of the local unions presented certain common 
bargaining demands such as in the field of health and \Yelfare 
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benefits through a nUnity Council," but as each negotiation was 
concluded, separate contracts \vere signed by the cornpany 
and each local union claiming bargaining rights. The particular 
contracts \V hich are of record demonstrate that each union 
was the sole bargaining agent for the particular employees 
certified through the National Labor Relations Board election 
procedures. 
1'here is some conflict in the testimony as to whether 
Electrical Workers Local1438 ever formally struck the company 
or directly participated in the work stoppage. On October 
31 ,1959, Electrical Workers Local 1438, BR-235 (R. 017-
018) advised the company it was not on strike, and, in turn, 
ordered the Unity Council not to list that local as one of the 
striking unions in their advertisements, publicity or demands 
to the company. Previously this local through its business 
manager, one T. E. Burke, had orally disaffirmed the local's 
involvement in the strike and mailed the letter to the company 
to verify the fact. The company's letter to this local on No-
vetnber 2, 1959, acknowledged that this local was not con-
sidered a striking union and effected a day-to-day extension 
of the old agreement. BR-235 (R. 018). Arrangements for 
the return of day-to-day people to the Central Power Station 
followed this exchange of correspondence, and provisions of the 
old contract were thus reinstituted for these electrical workers. 
Following the shutdown, the company halted power production 
and maintained its power needs through purchase from Utah 
Po\ver & Light Company. By November 12, 1959, six or seven 
men1bers of the Electrical Local had returned to work at the 
Central Power Station but the remaining 65 to 70 employees were 
not recalled until the total strike settlement around January 29, 
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1960.No employee of Local1438 performed picket duties at any 
time and the returning employees crossed the picket lines after 
November 12th, BR-235 (R. 071). These workers continued 
on the job until the end of the strike. Local 1438 finally settled 
their new agreement with the company January 7, 1960. The 
company supplied power to its departments through purchases 
from the Utah Power & Light Company until January 29, 1960, 
maintaining that on the basis of the power necessary, the plant 
could be more adequately operated by power purchase and 
consequently took the position there was no work available 
for the 65 to 70 other members of this unit. Notwithstanding 
this disavowal of the strike, the resumption of day-to-day 
contract, and the return of men recalled by the company by 
November 12, the Unemployment Compensation Division 
ruled that the remaining 60-70 members were disqualified 
because of their participation in the strike. 
Kennecott Copper Corporation's production activities in 
Utah prior to August 10, 1959, were carried on chiefly, as 
follows: the ore is mined at Bingham Canyon, Utah; then 
hauled by rail so1ne 15 miles north to the concentration mills 
at Magna and Arthur, Utah; concentrates are transported to 
the smelter; and the main smelter product is taken to the 
refinery. The mills, smelter and refinery are all situated within 
a radius of about three miles. Prior to January 1, 1959, the 
smelter \vas O\vned and operated by the American Smelting 
& Refining Company, as it had been for many years previously. 
The smelter was purchased on that date by Kennecott and 
operated by the company thereafter. 
The claimants here number in excess of 4,000 etnployees 
and are n1embers of various separate and autonomous local 
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unions. The electrical workers are a trade unton. The steel 
workers are an industrial union. Similarly, other workers belong 
to trade, craft and industrial unions. Some are affiliated with 
the APL-CIO and others are not. Indeed, on many occasions 
historically the unions have battled each other for \vork juris-
diction rights. Some contracts provide for job evaluation 
while other contracts create job rate classications. Insurance, 
health and welfare payments are maintained by different 
carriers and are under different programs. Hiring practices 
differ on the basis of plant and departmental requirements. 
The smelter has its superintendent, the refinery its superin-
tendent, as do the mines and mills. Seniority practices differ 
with each contract. As to total plant shutdowns, particular 
plant seniority exists. As to advances in position, departmental 
seniority exists. Employees in the smelter cannot bump across 
to the refinery, nor can seniority be claimed between mine or 
mill, nor can departmental employees bump across depart-
mental lines. 
Negotiations to settle the strike were carried on between 
the company and the individual unions involved after August 
10 \vith the assistance of federal mediators. 
The following chart shows the date each union reached 
contract settlen1ent with the company: 







November 21, 1959 
November 21, 1959 
November 21, 1959 
November 21, 1959 
November 21, 1959 
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International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers 
December 16, 1959 
December 16, 1959 
December 16, 1959 
Local 1845 December 22, 1959 
Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Firemen & Enginemen 
Lodge 670 December 24, 1959 
Order of Railroad Carmen & 
Brakemen 
Lodge 506 December 24, 1959 
Brotherhood of Railroad Carmen 
of America 
Lodge 1045 December 27, 1959 
0 perating Engineers 
Local 3 December 30, 1959 
Office Employees International Union 
Local 286 January 4, 1960 




International Association of Machinists 
January 8, 1960 
January 18, 1960 
Local 568 January 27~ 1960 
System Federation 
Lodge 155 
Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Fire1nen & Enginemen 
Lodge 844 
8 
January 27, 1960 
January 27, 1960 
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It \vill be noted above that the Steelworkers Locals' settle-
Inents on l~ove1nber 21, 1959, paved the way for the strike's 
end. 
'The s1nelter etnployees (Steelworkers Locals 4347 and 
-1329) following ratification of their agreements November 21, 
1959, returned to work pursuant to a strike settlement agree-
ment \vhich called for their ((prompt return," BR-236 (R. 033). 
Between November 22 and November 24, 1959, 708 smelter 
employees were back at work while 167 were scheduled off. 
/dl but 96 of the 1170 on the smelter payroll had returned 
to \vork by November 30, 1959 BR-236 (R. 059). The smelter 
clerical employees were called back according to seniority 
qualifications in line of work. 
On the afternoon shift, December 1, 1959, pickets of the 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen and Order 
of Railroad Carmen and Brakemen were established at the 
smelter. This was the first date railroad brotherhood workers 
picketed the sn1elter property since the strike commenced 
August 10, 1959. However, smelter employees did not leave 
their jobs when the pickets appeared. The railroad brother-
hoods commenced their picketing when it was learned that 
the company was attempting to utilize motor transport com-
mon carriers to move smelter products. The steelworkers, 
\\'ell aware that it would be futile to attempt to cross a picket 
line without inviting violence, respected the line. By December 
25, 1959, the railroad brotherhoods signed strike agreements, 
\vithdrew the pickets and a general recall of the production 
and maintenance and clerical workers began at the sn1elter and 
refinery. 
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During the week ending January 10, 1960, there were 3 71 
employees of Steelworkers Local 4347 laid off after completing 
five working days. Layoffs were according to plant seniority. 
The reason given was that the supply of ore at the smelter 
was exhausted. Each employee was given a blue separation 
slip supplied by the Unemployment Office, indicating the 
separation was due to a reduction in force due to strike at 
other plants, BR-236 (R. 058). During the week ending 
January 16, 1960, 5 50 additional production and smelter 
employees were laid off on the same basis. On January 18, 
1960, there were 242 employees still working at the smelter on 
maintenance, cleanup and material inventory. On January 20, 
1960, six junior clerical and technical employees from the 
smelter were told not to report to work because there was no 
work for them. They were given blue separation slips. On 
January 31, 1960, 274 employees remained on the payroll 
of the smelter. Between February 1 and 4, 1960, the employees 
laid off were recalled according to their plant seniority and 
returned to work. On February 4, 1960, there were 114 
employees out of 115 3 who had not returned to the smelter. 
All of the facts set forth above are digested from the record 
BR-236 (R. 058-061), Company Exhibits K and L. 
The refinery story is digested at BR-236 (R. 040-042). 
following ratification of the refinery contract, November 21, 
1959, over 400 of the Steelworkers Local 4413 employees 
were called back to the refinery the week of November 23, 
1959. The ren1aining 300 were not called back nbecause no 
work was available for them." BR-236 (R. 078). Refinery 
employees suffered the satne fate as smelter employees \vhen 
the railroad brotherhoods picketed the refinery early in De-
10 
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cen1ber. \\/ ith the removal of these picket lines December 25, 
refinery employees \vere also recalled BR-236 (R. 105-106). 
Two of the three refinery furnaces were closed January 4 to 
15, 1960, with one continuing to January 29, 1960. Production 
and maintenance work was resumed at the refinery on February 
8, 1960 . 
. Anticipating vacation shutdown schedule for August 10-
23, 1959, prior to the strike, company had stockpiled concen-
trates at the smelter which enabled the smelter and refinery 
to operate on a steady basis for a two-week period. BR-236 
(R. 104). During December, 1959, and January, 1960, the 
company also shipped for refining approximately 9800 tons 
of copper anodes outside the state, BR-236 (R. 105). 
The Mine-Mill unions were the second group to reach 
final contract agreement with the company on December 16, 
1959, but none of these employees were recalled to work until 
February 6, 1960. Following contract ratification by Mine-
l\1ill unions, other unions maintained picket lines at the mines 
and mills which "'ere withdrawn as each local union settled 
its contract. 
Final contract settlements were made January 27, 1960, 
with the Machinists, System Federation and Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, paving the way for the 
return of Kennecott's employees to the mines and mills on 
February 6, 1960. 
Steelworkers Local 5486, representing the unit of clerical 
and laboratory employees at the mills, also ratified and ap-
proved the contract with other steelworkers unions November 
21, 1959, and expressed willingness to resume their former 
11 
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work and perform their former duties at the Mills, BR-230 
(R. 011), but as late as January 13, 1960, had not been recalled 
to their jobs. Originally the Unemployment Compensation 
Department declared these claimants eligible for unemploy-
ment benefits on the ground there was no work available for 
them. This decision was later reversed by the Appeals Referee 
and affirmed. 
Elvere R. Davis ( 60-BR-231) maintains that he had been 
separated from his employment with the company three days 
before the strike and was given a blue separation notice BR-
231 (R. 001). Mr. ·navis' claim was also denied even though 
he had been separated from work prior to the strike. 
Office Employees Local 286 are engaged in the mtne 
area BR-23 7 (R. 083) and reached a contract settlement 
January 3, 1960. They had discontinued picketing within a 
few days after the strike commenced, August 10. Following 
contract ratification, Local 286 president contacted the Rail-
road Brotherhoods to seek passes through the picket lines 
but they were rejected. 
The critical point found in all cases by the Appeals Referee 
is that all operations of Utah Division, Kennecott Copper 
Corporation, constitute a single establishment, on the basis 
of general and specific business administration and company 
control as well as proximity, integrality and interdependence 
of the company's various production departments. The Appeals 
Referee concluded in all cases that the entire Utah Division 
of the company consists of one establishment at which the 
clain1ants were last employed, BR-23 7 (R. 087), and further. 
it concluded that all claimants became unemployed due to J 
12 
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stoppage of work which existed because of a strike involving 
their grade, cL.bs, or group at that establishment. The dis-
qualification was applied to all claimants as of August 10, 
L959, and continued through February 6, 1960. Timely appeals 
from the Board of Review's decision were taken in all cases. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The Board of Review erred as a matter of law and fact 
in deny~ng the claimants benefit·s in holding: 
1. That Utah Copper Division, Kennecott Copper Corpo-
ration, operation in Utah constitutes a single factory or estab-
lishment within the meaning of the Act, Section 5 (d) . 
2. That the work stoppage did not end until February 6, 
1960, when the plant resumed "normal operations" for: 
(a) The workers represented by United Steelworkers 
of America, Local 5486; 
(b) The workers represented by International Br·other-
hood of Electrical Workers, Local 1438; 
(c) The workers represented by International Union 
of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, Locals 485 
and 392; 
(d) The workers represented by International Union 
of Office Employees, Local 286; 
(e) Tile w·orkers represented by United Steelworkers 
of America, Locals 4329, 4347, 4413 and 5120; 
and 
(f) Elvere R. Davis, individually, and as a member of 
his local union. 
3. That· the unemployment of the claimants represented 
13 
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by the local unions set forth in 2. (a through f above) was 
due to a work stoppage that resulted because of a strike 
involving his grade, class or group of workers at the factory 
or establishment at which he is or was last employed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Board of Review erred as a matter of law and fact in 
denying the claimants benefits in holding: 
( 1 ) That Utah Copper Division, KennecoH Copper Cor-
poration, operation in Utah constitutes a single factory or 
establishment within the meaning of the act, Secti·on 5 (d). 
Section 35-4-5 (d) of the Utah Employment Security Act 
provides: 
c c 5. An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or 
for purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
n (d) For any week in which it is found by the com-
mission that his unemployment is due to a stoppage of 
work which exists because of a strike involving his 
grade, class, or group of workers at the factory or 
establishment in which he is or was last employed. 
ct ( 1) If the commission, upon investigation, shall 
find a strike has been fomented by a worker of any 
employer, none of the workers of that grade, class, or 
group of \vorkers of the individual who is found 
being a party of such plan or agreement to fon1ent a 
strike, shall be eligible for benefits; provided, however, 
that if the commission, upon investigation, shall find 
that such strike is caused by the failure or refusal of 
any employer to conform to the provisions of any law 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the State of Utah, or of the United State, pertain-
ing to hours, wages or other conditions of work, such 
strike shall not render the workers ineligible for 
benefits. 
'' ( 2) If the commission upon investigation, shall 
find that the employer, his agent, or representative, has 
conspired, planned or agreed with any of his workers, 
their agents or representatives, to foment a strike, such 
strike shall not render the workers ineligible for bene-
fits." 
The pivotal and basic question of law to be resolved 
from all of the facts in this consolidated petition requires a 
determination as to whether Utah Copper Division, Kennecott 
Copper Corporation's operations in Utah constitutes a single 
factory or establishment within the meaning of the act. 
Claimants have carefully reviewed the prior rulings of 
this court annotated and cited, Operating Engineers, Local 
Union No. 3, v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 318 P. 2d 
3 36, and conclude that the factual situation existing here dis-
tinguishes these cases from the prior cited cases which seem 
to settle the law. 
In Operating Engineers, Local Union No. 3, supra, the 
court held that the strike of one union would be intended 
as a pressure beneficial to all 11 unions. The case answers 
only the question of the group involved and does not resolve 
the issue of n a single establishment., 
Nor do any of the cases therein cited, in our view, namely, 
Iron Workers t'. Industrial Comntission. 104 Utah 242, 139 
P. 2d 208; Olof Nelson Constfuction Company z·. Industrial 
Conllnission, 121 Utah 525, 243 P. 2d 951, and Teamsters, 
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etc., v. Orange Transportation Company, 5 Utah 2d 45, 296 
P. 2d 291, answer the question raised here. 
Those cases were decided on the basis of what constitutes 
a "group" within the meaning of the statute. To our knowledge 
the Utah Supreme Court has not definitely wrestled with the 
problem before of a t (single establishrnent,'' and determination 
of this question is the basic predicate upon which the qualifica-
tion or disqualification of the claimants involved must be 
decided. 
The common denominator used by the Appeals Referee 
and the Board of Review is contained in BR-236 (R. 052), 
company Exhibit B, entitled ((The Utah Copper Story 1959.'' 
This document was received in evidence by the Appeals Referee 
to assist him insofar as he adopted ((integral functioning" as 
a basic test of the extent of an ((establishment." Apparently 
the Appeals Referee and Board of Review considered the 
evidence and testimony relating to management and operation 
of the Utah Copper Division as the chief test. All the findings 
in all the cases involved the finding in BR-236 (R. 109) : 
t (On the basis of both general and specific business 
administration and control as well as proximity, 
integrality and interdependence of various production 
departments, it must be considered that the entire physi-
cal plant of the Utah Copper Division of the Kennecott 
Copper Corporation constitutes one establishment at 
which the clain1ants in this case were employed." 
These findings entirely disregard the various departments, 
mine, mills, central power station, metallurgical laboratory, 
smelter, refinery and maintenance shops as separate establish-
ments and in so doing run against the employer and en1ployee 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
relationship differences demonstrated by the record. The 
Appeals Referee \Vas itnpressed that the mine, mills, refinery, 
sn1elter, po¥:er station, haulage system, etc., were all simply 
interdependent units within the general establishment. This 
n1ay be in keeping with some decisions on this point, but there 
is substantial law to the contrary. 
A con1 parison of the pertinent contract provisions existing 
between the various local unions and the company will demon-
strate that: 
( 1) 'The union recognized as the sole bargaining agent 
for the employees of a particular unit, in most cases, arose out 
of National Labor Relations Board election procedures, and 
in some cases it is a matter of common knowledge that juris-
diction for these jobs was hard fought between the unions them-
selves. 
( 2) In all steelworkers' contracts, rates of pay are deter-
mined by job evaluation studies. The steelworkers are a 
vertical industrial union. Central Power House Station, Local 
1438, is not an industrial union, but is a craft of electrical 
workers. This is true of the machinists local and railroad local. 
( 3) The \vages established for craft locals is a bargained 
rate without regard to increments and job evaluation. 
( 4) There is contractual difference in the health and 
v1elfare insurance, and the carriers who provide the coverage 
for the various claimants and their several local unions. 
It is uncontroverted that employees at the refinery do 
not have the right to bump across to the smelter or mine or 
mill or vice-versa. The refinery was during the period of time 
involved in this dispute headed by a separate superintendent 
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as was the smelter, as was the mine, the mill department, the 
central power station, etc. Hiring practices were clearly sepa-
rate and distinct. Seniority differs pursuant to each contract. 
Vacation and fringe benefits are not identical, nor did the 
company introduce in evidence any uniform working rules 
applicable to all the departments. 
Scrutiny of this record will disclose these historic and 
contractual differences among the employees, indeed even 
among the various locals. True, we have here one single em-
ploying unit, but that does not necessarily render that single 
employing unit a separate establishment within the meaning 
of the law. A partnership which operates three bowling alleys 
and a bottling concern may be a single employing unit, but 
each of the establishments may be separate. See Canada Dry 
Bottling Company v. Board of Review, 223 P.2d 586. 
See Nordling v. Ford Motor Company, 231 Minn. 68, 
42 N.W. 2d 576, 28 A.L.R. 2d 272, which holds: 
((The question whether the assembly plant was an 
establishment separate from the manufacturing plant, 
or whether both were parts of the same establishment, 
should be determined, under all the facts available, 
from the standpoint of unlike employment rather than 
of management; that the test of functional integrality, 
general unity and physical proximity should not be 
adopted as absolute, but merely as elements to be taken 
into consideration with other factors." 
The Supreme Court of Michigan, recently reversing its 
former ruling in Ch1-ysler Corporation v. Smith, 297 Mich . 
. ·!.38, 298 N.W. 870, 28 A.L.R. 2d 327, now establishes a 
highly sensible rationale in vte\v of the liberal construction 
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
necessarily required in making determinations as to unemploy-
ment compensation eligibility. 
A thoughtrul reading of Park v. Appeal Board of Michigan 
(January 12, 1959), 359 Mich. 103, 94 N.W. 2d 407, 
points up the complexity of the problem surrounding a finding 
of ··establishment.'' 
Certainly it is good public policy to see the end of an 
involved lengthy strike such as this. The steelworkers local, 
who were obtaining meager strike benefits from their inter-
national, were automatically cut off from those benefits on 
November 21, 1959, through their settlement. Yet they \vere 
penalized until February 6, 1960, by the Appeals Referee 
finding that the plant only then returned to normal operations. 
A denial of unemployment compensation for those for whom 
work \Vas unavailable constitutes a double penalty of the loss 
of statutory benefits as well as union benefits. Should the steel-
·workers have refused to have settled until all 19 unions 
settled, and thus risk a delay in ultimately ending the strike 
in order to retain their own strike benefits because the policy 
of the law was to continue their disqualification? We think 
the question answers itself, and particularly where the evidence 
sho\vs that commencing November 23 through 27, the smelter 
and refinery had resumed substantial operations with their 
production, maintenance and clerical crews. Even if refusal 
to cross the picket lines of the railroad brotherhoods set up 
December 2 and withdrawn December 25, 1959, was dis-
qualifying, ho"' does the Board sustain continuing disquali-
fication after all picket lines were withdrawn from the refinery 
and smelter on December 26, 1959, and those two units returned 
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to substantial operations to smelt and refine the ore concen-
trates stockpiled for the company's original vacation shutdown 
planned in August, 1959? How did the company regard 
these smelter and refinery workers after the concentrates and 
ore supply was exhausted? They laid off men pursuant to 
seniority and qualifications, gave each of them a blue separation 
slip, conceded that, ((there was no work available," and ob-
served seniority in recall. 
And, how did the Board of Review regard Local Union 
1438, Electrical Workers? That decision contains no finding 
that these claimants disaffirmed the strike and by letters of 
October 31 and November 2, 1959, actually reinstituted em-
ployer relationship on a day-to-day basis, returning six or 
seven employees to the Central Power House because no others 
were needed; yet, the company purchased substantial power 
from the local public utility to meet its demands. How the 
Board concluded in this case that other members of Local 
1438 refused to cross a picket line is an anomaly. If the con1-
pany had no work available for the remaining 60 to 70 men, 
having exercised its prerogative to purchase power, what does 
it matter that they refused to cross a picket line if there was 
no work available for them? 
Elvere R. Davis was not even an employee of the company 
on August 7, 1959, when he received his separation notice. 
Yet, Mr. Davis was disqualified as if he were still a member 
of the local union involved in the strike. 
The solution is not to be found merely in physical isolation 
of the various properties, nor geographical proximity, nor in 
the schen1e of management, supervision and production. At 
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nuntn1un1, this court should remand these cases to the Board 
of Review to n1ake ~indings and give consideration to the source 
of authority in hiring and discharging employees, to the manne~· 
of seniority practices, and other differences betv1een the 19 
unions and the company which demonstrate separateness. 
Under the circumstances all employment practices, rather than 
those of management and operation, are of primary importance 
in determining the unity and integrality or the lack of unity 
and lack of integrality of the claimants. The dependence of 
one or more of the company's departments upon Division 
Office control and supervision, does not necessarily make of 
the entire industry one plant or one establishment any more 
than by a pyramiding of corporate structures, the Utah Copper 
Division can be keyed to its Ray Mines Division, its South 
American operations, or, in turn, to its Eastern refineries. See 
Tucker ·v. Anzerican Smelting & Refining Company, 189 Md. 
250, 55 A. 2d 692, where the court ruled employees of a 
Balitmore refinery eligible because of a strike in this same 
Utah smelter when both plants were owned by ASARCO. 
The danger with such easy reasoning is that we will ultimately 
pyramid upon any manufacturer who might regularly buy 
materials and supplies from certain suppliers, a result which 
the unemployment statutes do not contemplate. 
\Vith these factors in mind, let us consider Park z). Appe(t! 
Board of lviicbigan (supra). 
At pp. 412-413: 
((Judges and lawyers can frequently do astonishing 
things with words. No layman would venture to sug-
gest that the single word (establishment', used in the 
paragraph above, could in normal usage be applied 
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to both the Ford Rouge plant in Dearborn, Michigan, 
and the Ford forge plant in Canton, Ohio. 
((The writer believes also that no layman, without 
a specific motive in mind, would read the statutory 
provisions quoted above and come to the conclusion 
that the legislature had any such inclusiveness in its 
intended use of the word. Although the statute carries 
within it no definition of (establishment,' its use of 
the term is, in our opinion, such as clearly to rule out 
the broad interpretation sought by appellees. Thus, 
the statute defines the term (employing unit' in the 
same broad sense which appellees seek to apply to 
(establishment': 
( ((Employing unit" means any individual or type 
of organization, including any partnership, associa-
tion, trust, estate, joint-stock company, insurance 
company or corporation, whether domestic or for-
eign, * * * ' 
((And, in the second sentence of the same definition 
paragraph, it makes such use of the word c establish-
ment' as, in our view, to preclude any attempt at defi-
nition in terms of all integrated plants of a company, 
wherever located: 
CAll individuals performing services \Yithin this 
state for any employing unit which maintains 2 or 
more separate establishments \vithin this state shall 
be deetned to be employed by a single employing unit 
for all the purposes of this act.' " 
See the identical definition contained under the Utah Act, 
3 5-4-22 (h). 
At pp. 416-419: 
(CAs \ve have previously noted, compensation was 
allo\ved in 8 of these 9 cases after rejection of the 
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argument that Ford Motor Company integration ren-
dered the individual far-flung plants 1 establishment 
with the Ford Rouge plant in Dearborn, Michigan. The 
exception was the Georgia case, where the Georgia 
supreme court rejected liberal construction of the un-
employn1ent cotnpensation act and flatly stated with a 
finality unhampered by excess concern for fine defini-
tion or logic: 
'We therefore hold that the Hapeville plant, at 
which the claimants were employed, and the Dear-
born parts-producing plant, where the strike occurred 
and which compelled cessation of work at the Hape-
ville plant, were inseparable and indispensable parts 
of one and the same ((factory, establishment, or 
other premises" as contemplated by those terms as 
employed in the act now being construed.' Ford 
Motor Co. v. Abercombie, 207 Ga. 464, 470, 62 
S.E. 2d 209, 215. 
'"The balance of the courts followed definition of 
the word 'establishment' very similar to that which we 
have referred to. The New Jersey supreme court held: 
'The standard of "functional integration" is not 
to be found in the legislative expression. The statu-
tory sense of the term "establishment" is not em-
bracive of the whole of Ford's far-flung enterprise 
as a single industrial unit. It has reference to a 
distinct physical place of business. Such is its normal 
usage in business and in government. A. H. Phillips, 
Inc. v. Walling, 1945, 324 U.S. 490, 65 S. Ct. 807, 
89 L. Ed. 1095. ((Establishment" is defined as the 
((place where one is permanently fixed for residence 
or business;" also, "an institution or place of busi-
ness. Webster's New International Dictionary, 
2d ed.' Ford Motor Co. v. New Jersey Department 
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C!The Virginia supreme court, with reasontng ,I've 
consider sound, held: 
(The Unemployment Compensation Act, * * * was 
intended to provide temporary financial assistance 
to workmen who became unemployed without fault 
on their part. The statute as a whole, as well as the 
particular sections here involved, should be so in-
terpreted as to effectuate that remedial purpose 
implicit in its enactment. When its purpose is kept 
in view, we cannot agree that managerial and opera-
tional integration and functional cooperation upon 
the official level are to be the chief factors upon 
which employment status and employees' rights are 
to be determined. Our problem is, in the final analy-
sis, to recognize the remedial aim and purpose of 
the Act and then interpret and construe the language 
and apply it to the facts proved. In doing this, we 
do not think that the contractual obligations and re-
lations brought about through execution of the master 
labor contract by Ford Motor Co. and UA W-CIO 
may be considered as determining whether or not 
the Norfolk plant and the Rouge plant constitute 
and are one establishment within the meaning of the 
statute. Those plants either constitute one establish-
ment or separate establishments regardless of whether 
the master labor contract is or is not in force. The 
circumstances of employment, rather than those of 
management and operation, are of primary impor-
tance in determining the unity and integration, or 
the lack of unity and integration of the plants. 
The accumulative weight and effect of these cir-
cumstances \Ve think, are sufficient to sho\v that 
the Norfolk assembly plant is separate from the 
Rouge plant. No labor dispute or strike was fomented 
or participated in by the local union to \vhich the 
clai1nant employees belong, nor was there any labor 
dispute on the premises, at the plant, or in the estab-
lishment 'vhere they were actually employed. The 
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
labor dispute and resultant strike were in fact and 
in reality at and in Dearborn. The most that can be 
said is that the management and operation of the 
vast and far-flung Ford Motor industry is so inte-
grated and synchronized that a serious strike at its 
headquarters and in its principal plants at Dearborn 
must in time affect the entire industry and cause the 
shutdown of plants and other establishments wher-
ever situated. The dependence of one or more plants 
in this great industry upon the home office and prin-
cipal manufacturing establishment does not, how-
ever, necessarily make of the entire industry one 
plant or one establishment.' Ford Motor Co. v. Un-
employment Compensation Commission, 191 Va. 
812, 824, 825, 63 S.E. 2d 28, 33. 
ccln a number of cases we have referred to, the act 
construed referred to 'factory, establishment or other 
pren1ises, as was true in the draft version of the model 
statute. In the case arising from the shut down of the 
St. Paul, Minnesota, assembly plant, the word Hestab-
lishment' was employed alone after amendment had 
deleted the accompanying words 'factory' and 'other 
premises'-in short, the san1e situation as prevails at 
present in relation to our Michigan statute. 
nln a very similar fact situation with a very similar 
statutory provision to construe, the Minnesota court 
set forth .the following analysis of the (establishment' 
problem on which we do not think we can improve: 
(Rather than distinguish the cases on differing 
facts, we prefer to place decision on the broader 
ground that we believe that the test of functional 
integrality, general unity, and physical proximity 
should not be adopted as an absolute test in all cases 
of this type. No doubt, these factors are elements 
that should be taken into consideration in determin-
ing the ultimate question of whether a factory plant, 
or unit of .'1 larger industry is a separate establish-
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ment within the meaning of our employer and 
security law. However, there are other factors which 
must also be taken into consideration. The difficulty 
with attempting to use, as an absolute test, the factors 
laid down in the Spielman case comes in its appli-
cation to the facts of a particular case. Many enter-
prises have functional integrality between factories 
which are separtaely owned. Some are so integrated 
in part with units or factories having the satne O\vner-
ship and in part with factories or plants which are 
independently owned. That is the situation which 
we have in the instant case. Out of some 3,800 or 
4,000 parts, about 900 come from the Rouge plant. 
Some come from other plants owned by the Ford 
Motor Company, and still others come from plants 
independently owned. A shutdown caused by a strike 
or other labor dispute at one of such independent 
vendors might conceivably cause a shutdown at the 
St. Paul Ford plant. This did actually happen in 
1945, when a strike occurred at the Kelsey Hayes 
plant. We assume that it is not uncommon that the 
same international union would represent the em-
ployes of several independent plants or factories 
operating as the Ford plant does with its independent 
vendors, but we do not believe that anyone would 
contend that a strike at the plant of such independent 
vendor would disqualify employes of the Ford plant 
if it was forced to shut down on account of the lack 
of parts furnished by such independent vendor. 
(Proximity is equally unsatisfactory. In order to 
apply this factor, what distance shall be considered 
short enough to constitute proximity? Shall the 
St. Paul branch of the Ford plant be close enough 
to the Rouge plant and the Georgia or Los Angeles 
plants, operating in a similar manner, be too far 
a\vay, or shall any two plants any,vhere in the lJniteJ 
States be near enough? 
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'Nor is general unity of itself a test. Our statutes 
recognize that the same employing unit may main-
tain two or more separate establishments within 
the State. § 268.04, subd. 9. It might be argued that 
the legislature had in mind separate establishments 
\vhich are not related in any way, but the legislature 
did not so state, and we do not believe it can be 
read into the statute. In A. H. Phillips, Inc. v. Wall-
ing, 324 U.S. 490, 65 S. Ct. 807, 89 L.Ed 1095, 157 
A.L.R. 876, supra, there was general unity, but that 
did not prevent the court from holding that the 
warehouse was an establishment separate from the 
retail part of the business. 
'If, then, these tests standing alone do not suffice, 
is it a combination of all of them which makes them 
sufficient? If one is lacking, are the others sufficient, 
or must they all concur? We believe the better rule 
to be that these factors, together with other facts, 
must be taken into consideration in determining 
whether the unit under consideration is in fact a 
separate establishment from the standpoint of em-
ployment. The St. Paul branch of the Ford Motor 
Company is highly integrated with other units of 
the company for purposes of efficient management 
and operation, but is separate insofar as the employes 
are concerned for the purpose of employment. The 
employes are hired and discharged by the St. Paul 
manager. They are members of a local union which 
has no connection with the locals at Dearborn except 
that all locals are members of the same international, 
as are many others not connected with the Ford 
Motor Company. The seniority rights of the employes 
extend only to operations at the St. Paul plant. No 
showing has been made, nor do we believe that any 
can be made, that an employe at the St. Paul branch 
can "bump" an employe at the Rouge plant, the Los 
Angeles plant, the Georgia plant, or anywhere else 
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than at the St. Paul plant. Payment to the Minne-
sota unemployment compensation fund is made only 
for employes at the St. Paul plant, and, obviously, 
benefits can be drawn only by employes in the St. 
Paul branch from the Minnesota fund. Employment 
under the act relates to services performed within 
the State or localized here. The members of Local 
8 79 had nothing to do with calling the strike at 
the Rouge plant and could do nothing to avert it. 
While the record does not so show, "'e assume that 
under our act the contribution rate of the employer 
is based on the experience ratio of employes within 
this state without any regard to the experience in 
other states. 
(Under § 5 (d) of the act proposed by the Social 
Security Board and under our original act, the unit 
of employment within which the labor dispute must 
exist in order to disqualify was designated as the 
rrfactory establishment, or other premises at which 
he is or was last employed." (Italics supplied.) 
Under our present act, § 268.09, subd. 1 ( 6), the 
strike or labor dispute must be in progress ctat the 
establishment in which he is or was employed." 
(Italics supplied). It is doubtful that the change 
in terminology was intended to enlarge or diminish 
the unit of employment affecting the disqualification. 
It has been held that the words t(factory, establish-
ment or other premises" in the Alaska act, which 
is similar to the Federal act, were ejusdem generis 
and that the principle of noscitur a sociis applies. 
Aragon v. Unemployment Compensation Comm., 
9 Cir., 149 F.2d 447, supra. 
(We are inclined to believe that in our original 
act the word H establishment" was intended to include 
those places of etnployment \vhich could not be classi-
fied as a factory; that in the amendment the legis-
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lature concluded that the term "establishment" was 
inclusive of factory and all other types of employer 
units; and that there was no further need to use the 
word ufactory." For a discussion of the distinction 
between factory and establishment, see General 
Motors Corp. v. Mulquin, 134 Conn. 118, 55 A.2d 
732, supra. 
'The term "establishment" as used in our amended 
act should be given no broader meaning than it had 
in the original act, except that it now includes "fac-
tory" and "other premises" set out separately in the 
original act. Our Act, patterned after the act pro-
posed by the Social Security Board, is in turn pat-
terned after the British National Insurance Act of 
1911 ( 1 & 2 George V, c. 55, pt. 2 § 87), which 
was amended in 1935 (25 George V. c. 8, pt. 3, 
§ 26). Under both the 1911 and the 1935 British 
acts, disqualification is based upon a \vork stoppage 
due to a trade dispute at the rrfactory workshop or 
other premises" (italics supplied) at which the 
claimant is employed. The British umpire, which is 
the final arbiter under the British act, has consistently 
held that the words ''factory, workshop or other 
premises," refer to single units of employment. The 
only substantial change in the language of our origi-
nal act from the British act was that the word 
"establishment" was substituted for ((workshop." It 
is difficult to believe that this change was intended 
to broaden the scope of the employment area so as 
to emcompass a whole industry rather than a single 
unit of employment.' Nordling v. Ford Motor Co., 
231 Minn. 68, 85-89, 42 N.W. 2d 576, 586." 
Appellants also make brief reference to Tennessee Coal, 
Iron & Railroad Co. v. Martin, 251 Ala. 153, 36 So. 2d 547. 
There the employer argued for disqualification of non-striking 
members of the United Mine Workers. Yet, their coal mining 
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operations were shut down as a result of strikes by other unions 
in the steel making and ore mining operations of the company. 
The Alabama supreme court rejected the integration argument, 
holding that the words of their act must be interpreted as they 
are ··commonly used and understood.'' 
See also, Shell Oil v. Cummins} 70 Ill. 2d 329, 131 N.E. 
2d 64. There 12 metal trade unions were not barred by joint 
negotiations as directly interested or as men1bers of the same 
grade. 
II. 
The Board of Review erred as a matter of law and fact in 
denying the claimants benefits in holding: 
( 2) That the work stoppage did not end until February 
6, 1960, when the plant resumed "normal operations" for: 
(a) the workers represented by United Steelworkers 
of America, Local 5486; 
(b) the workers represented by International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers, Local 1438; 
(c) t·he workers represented by International Union 
of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, Locals 485 
and 392; 
(d) the workers represented by International Union 
of Office Employees, Local 286; 
(e) the workers represented by United Steelworkers 
of America, Locals 4329,4347,4413 and 5120; 
(f) Elvere R. Davis, individually, and as a member of 
his local Union. 
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\X, hile this court has never been confronted with the 
necessity of interpreting the extent of the meaning of the 
words "stoppage of work" in connection with a particular 
strike ,there are cases in other jurisdictions which have decided 
the disqualification does not end at the time the labor dispute 
is settled, but continues while they are unemployed as a result 
of the labor dispute. SeeCarne gie-Illinois Steel Corporation t:. 
Rerieu' Boat"d. 117 Ind. App. 3 79, 72 N.E. 2d 622, and Bako 
z·. Board of Review (Penn.) 90 A.2d 302. 
But the foregoing cases are not necessarily determinative 
of the issues here since the basic qualification finding required 
in the first sentence of Section 35-4-5 (d) nat the factory or 
establishment at which he is or was last employed" must be 
legally made before the casual proviso becomes effective and 
before considering or applying the test of direct involvement 
set forth in subsection (d) 1. 
Ill. 
The Board of Review erred as a matter of law and fact 
in denying the claimants benefits in holding: 
( 3) That the unemployment of the claimants represented 
by the local unit)ns set forth in 2. (a through f above) was 
due to a work stoppage that resulted because of a strike in-
volving his grade, class or group of workers at the factory 
or establishment at which he is or was last employed. 
Again \ve are concerned with the basic qualification f1nding 
required in the first sentence of Section 35-4-5(d) \vhich must 
be made as the predicate before the further finding of involve-
ment of grade, class or group of workers. 
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The variety of work performed by the complex employee 
units has no comparison or sim.ilarity in bargaining history 
and contractual results with similar job grade, class or group 
of workers in any other units involved in the strike. The 
ratification and strike settlement of each local union would 
seem to argue for the end of that particular unit's disquali-
fication. Lexes v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 243 P.2d 
964, does not appear to control since the jobs of the railroad 
switchmen were actually absorbed into the steelworkers' unit, 
and there is no comparable fact situation in any of the instant 
cases. 
Analysis of the bargaining contracts of all these local 
unions, we believe, forecloses the Board of Review from making 
a broad finding that all employees collectively involved the 
same grade, class or group of workers at ccthe factory or 
establishment" at which he is or was last employed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons cited in this brief, we submit this court 
should reverse the Board of Review's decision and order that 
each grade, class and group of workers at each of the separate 
establishments, within the Utah Copper Division of Kennecott, 
be determined eligible for unemployment compensation benefits 
commencing with the date that each local ended its strike 
against the company and ratified a strike settlement agreement. 
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of December, 1960. 
A. WALLY SANDACK 
Attorney for Appellants 
405 Executive Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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